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NAGONA AND MZINGILE1 
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Makala haya yanapendekeza dhana ya “falsafa za lugha za Kiafrika” badala ya dhana kama “falsafa za 
kimapokeo” au “falsafa za kienyeji” ambazo zinatumiwa katika mjadala kuhusu “falsafa ya Kiafrika” 
siku hizi. Yanaieleza dhana hii kinadharia na kutoa maoni kwamba fasihi za lugha za Kiafrika ndivyo 
vyombo vya kuitekeleza kazi ya kifalsafa katika jamii za Kiafrika za kisasa. Katika muktadha huu, 
makala yanazingatia jinsi dhana za falsafa ya Magharibi zinavyoakisiwa katika maandishi ya Euphrase 
Kezilahabi, Nagona na Mzingile. 
Introduction 
My paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will define the basic concepts, such as “Af-
rican philosophy” and “Afrophone philosophies”, their relationship and the general context of the 
debate on “African philosophy”. I anticipate my definition here and say that “Afrophone philoso-
phies” are those discourses that are the medium of philosophical reflexion in a given culture. 
Thus in the second part of my paper, I will concentrate on one specific case of a philosophical 
reflexion, that of reflecting philosophical influences in the late works of Euphrase Kezilahabi, 
Nagona (1990) and Mzingile (1991).  
1. Definition of the basic concepts and the context of African philosophy 
1.1. African philosophy 
The discourse of what is called “African philosophy” has established itself as an academic 
discipline in the middle of the past century. According to its prominent historian, Dismas A. 
Masolo, of Kenya, the book to be considered the beginning of this debate was Placide Tempels’ 
                                                 
1 This paper was, in a reduced form, presented at the 17th Swahili Colloquium in Bayreuth, May 21-23, 2004. I 
would like to express my gratitude to Professor Elena Bertoncini-Zúbková, for her support and for providing me 
with otherwise inaccessible literature, Mr. Abdilatif Abdalla, for his selfless help and long-term guidance in the 
Swahili language, Professor Luboš Kropáček, for supervising my Ph.D. thesis and for his support, Dr. Kai Kresse, 
for making his excellent works accessible to me, Ms. Sonja Mezger and Mr. Lutz Diegner, for their stimulating 
thoughts and for sending me several important articles. My special thanks to Professor Euphrase Kezilahabi, for 
answering my questions and for providing me with additional references.  
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Bantu Philosophy, which appeared for the first time in a French translation in 1945 (Masolo 
1994: 46, Tempels 1945).  
 Of course, this does not mean that there were no philosophical debates in Africa prior to that 
date, or that in today’s African philosophy, the writings of individuals who published their works 
before Tempels are irrelevant. In fact, I have cited that date in order to create a distance to the 
concept of “African philosophy” and to propose a pragmatic definition of it as a specific dis-
course, set in its historical conditions and influenced by them in form and contents.2 To see what 
“African philosophy” is, it is perhaps best to browse through any of the numerous recent antholo-
gies, introductions, historical overviews or encyclopaedias that present African philosophy as an 
established academic discipline with a fairly firm inner division and contents.3 
 African philosophy is thus in no way representative of all philosophical currents in Africa, it 
may also not be an adequate representation. Nevertheless, it is a discourse that has in itself the 
possibilities of access to African philosophical ideas and furthering its knowledge of them, as 
well as the possibility of a critical reflexion on its own methodology and of a development of its 
cognitive tools. As a general discourse, it has the potential of interdisciplinary co-operation as 
regards the contents and the methodology (on the issue of interdisciplinarity, cf. Kresse 2002a, 
Kresse 2002b). 
 In the past decade, a number of monographs have been published (or re-edited) in African phi-
losophy that demonstrate great concern about approaching indigenous thought systems and about 
the issue of making use of them in present-day philosophy.4 
 In this place, I would like to mention only one study, the project of the German philosopher 
Kai Kresse, who focused on the philosophical discourse in Mombasa. Kresse emphasizes the 
need to study as philosophy that which is considered as important intellectual discourse by the 
society. As he writes:  
My aim was [...] to follow internal discourses of knowledge in Old Town Mombasa 
with a particular focus on how they generate reflexivity, and express critical 
                                                 
2 This definition comes close to Hountondji’s definition of African philosophy“: „J’appelle philosophie africaine un 
ensemble de textes: l’ensemble, précisément, des textes écrits par des Africains et qualifiés par leur auteurs eux-
mêmes de «philosophiques».“ („I call African philosophy a group of textes: precisely, the group of texts written by 
Africans and qualified by their authors themselves as ‘philosophical’.“) (Hountondji 1977: 11, my translation). 
Nevertheless, the concept of discourse delimits the boundaries of „African philosophy“ very differently: for one 
thing, it is not only Africans who participate in this discourse. I do not find the second part of Hountondji’s defini-
tion, the description of the texts as philosophical by their authors, satisfactory either; however, a detailed argument 
against it goes beyond the limits of this paper.  
3 In the last ten years, these works have appeared: introductions and history: Bidima 1995, Hallen 2002, Imbo 1998, 
Masolo 1994, Rettová 2001; anthologies: Coetzee & Roux 1998, English – Kalumba 1996, Eze 1997, Eze 1998, 
Mosley 1995; encyclopaedias: Deutsch & Bontekoe 1997, Smart 1999. 
4 Eg. Ephirim-Donkor 1997, Gyekye 1995, Hallen & Sodipo 1997, Hallen 2000, Kwame 1995, Oruka 1990, Wiredu 
1996, Wiredu & Gyekye 1992. For a more detailed description of this tendency, see Rettová 2004a. 
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discourses and self-awareness in society. In this, I focused on intellectuals who were 
of particular interest in this respect [...], active in Islamic scholarship, healing, and 
poetry, the three most prominent local categories for intellectuals for the Swahili 
context. (Kresse 2002b: 31) 
This effort to “situate and contextualize the study of African philosophical discourses in cultur-
ally specific African intellectual and religious discourses” (Kresse 2002b: 27) includes a consis-
tent use of an African language during the research (cf. also Kresse 1999, Kresse & Wiredu 
2000), and it also opened the door to literature as a point of reference of African philosophy.5  
1.2. Afrophone philosophies 
The call for a study of philosophy adjusted to the specific cultural context of a society points to a 
functional understanding of philosophy: philosophy is that discourse within a society which ful-
fils the function of reflecting various influences affecting the society. 
 Now, it is clear that it is not the discourse of African philosophy that serves this purpose in 
African societies. African philosophy has always come from outside, it is not a local intellectual 
tradition but at best a discourse on local intellectual traditions.  
 In view of this functional understanding of philosophy, it is also clear that the search of many 
scholars for an antiquated “traditional philosophy”, uninfluenced by modernity and untainted by 
colonialism, is misguided and the restrictions they often impose on their research are in fact ham-
pering it: from the requirement of illiteracy of the informants (Oruka 1990) to the bias of favour-
ing oral discourses (such as proverbs, recorded interviews with informants etc.) as materials from 
which to draw conclusions concerning the “philosophy” of an ethnic group. Written literatures go 
largely unheeded.6 
                                                 
5 Apart from Swahili poetry, Kresse himself has dealt with oral Zulu praise poetry (Kresse 1998) and with the work 
of the Ugandan scholar Okot p’Bitek, written in English and in Acholi (Kresse 2002a).  
6 I am referring here to the situation, to name one rather representative example, where excellent works on Yoruba 
philosophy are written (Hallen & Sodipo 1997, Hallen 2000) that draw on interviews with Yoruba onisegun (heal-
ers and diviners) and quote extensively many Anglophone sources on Yoruba wisdom and thought, but the out-
standing Yoruba writers who have produced works having a deep philosophical dimension go unnoticed, not out of 
negligence, but for reasons of the chosen methodology. Gbadegesin (1991: 118) makes a brief mention of 
Fagunwa, but the more recent literature, where elements of „Yoruba philosophy“ (in the sense of worldview, wis-
dom, beliefs etc.) get reflected and creatively developed, escapes the attention of philosophers altogether. The cleft 
between African philosophy and literary theory is somehow much wider than that between African philosophy and 
anthropology or ethnography.  
 For a tentative philosophical reading of Fagunwa, see Rettová 2002, see also Bamgbose 1974. Concerning the 
reflexion of traditional Yoruba wisdom in modern literature, see the excerpt from the novel by ‘Lasunkanmi Tela, 
Osuolale (published 1998), translated by Alena Nováková, and Nováková’s short commentary on it, in the „Afri-
can Reader“ (Tela 2003).  
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 I propose the term “Afrophone philosophies”7 to designate those discourses that fulfil the 
function of philosophy in a given African society. Therefore, Afrophone philosophies are the 
discourses that are the medium of philosophical reflexion in a given culture. Which are they?  
 It is my contention that the leading role in today’s African societies is to be attributed to Afri-
can literatures, and especially those using African languages.8 It is in those that both foreign and 
indigenous, both modern and traditional influences get reflected, elaborated, and creatively ap-
propriated or rejected. For any tradition must be reflected and developed, even one’s own. Of 
course, it is not only written forms of literature that are the medium of reflexion of philosophical 
ideas, but also oral literatures (see for example Kresse 1998) and popular songs and music9. 
 The term “Afrophone philosophies” lays great emphasis on language. The criterion of lan-
guage is a simple one, yet, it is a very effective differentiation. Individual languages carry spe-
cific conceptual schemes and evoke specific cultural contexts.10 
 But perhaps just as important as these qualities is the existence of a shared discourse, of a pub-
lic. Language then becomes a double-sided issue. One must account for operatively bilingual au-
thors – and indeed, bilingual discourses –, and so it is both context (namely the context of a spe-
cific discourse to which a work contributes) and language that determine whether certain works 
are to be classified as “Afrophone philosophy”.11 
                                                 
7 This term avoids the restrictions or unsuitable connotations of the alternatives, such as „traditional philosophy“ 
(used by many authors, e.g. Gbadegesin 1991, Rettová 2001), „indigenous philosophy“ (e.g. Hallen 2000) or „sage 
philosophy“ (Oruka 1990).  
8 Modern Afrophone literatures (literatures in African languages) are a perpetuation of the traditional intellectual 
discourse, they use the same words and operate within the same conceptual frame, they refer to proverbs, too, and 
they bend traditional wisdom according to the conditions and requirements of the present day. Specifically con-
cerning foreign influences, literatures using European languages will always have an intercultural slant, a more or 
less pronounced necessity to translate between different conceptual schemes and different cultural contexts. But it 
is in Afrophone literatures that foreign ideas are introduced into the local intellectual environment and evaluated 
against the background of the context of the local culture.  
 Naturally, there is more to Afrophone literatures than their philosophical side, such as their artistic qualities in the 
case of fiction or their contributions to other disciplines (history, ethnography, literary theory etc.) in the case of 
non-fiction works. Afrophone literatures are Afrophone philosophies in so far as they reflect and develop philoso-
phical contents and thus contribute to a philosophical debate. 
9 As my colleague from Angola, Leonardo Teca, who teaches Lingala at Prague, intends to explain in his disserta-
tion, the so-called Zairean music, which is popular music with lyrics in Lingala, played at discos, is the medium 
where the singers express their religious and philosophical ideas and argue against one another in their composi-
tions (information based on personal communication with Leonardo Teca). This phenomenon is certainly not 
unique for the Zairean music. Ezra Chitando points at a similar phenomenon within Zimbabwean gospel songs (see 
Liot 2002). 
10 See for example Kresse 1999, Kresse & Wiredu 2000, Wiredu 1996, Ngugi 1986. 
11 This article is part of a broader project, which I am developing in my Ph.D. thesis. There, more information on the 
theoretical grounding of the concept of „Afrophone philosophies“ as well as more ventures into specific Afro-
phone discourses will be offered, in the three case studies (apart from a study of Swahili literature, there will be a 
study concentrating on the corpus of divination poetry of the Yoruba deity Ifa and a study of the theoretical writing 
of the Zimbabwean Ndebele; concerning Ndebele literature, see also Rettová 2004b). Some of my remarks on 
„Afrophone philosophies“ in the article anticipate this broader context. 
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1.3. African philosophy and Afrophone philosophies 
African philosophy is the general discourse which has the advantages of interculturality and in-
terdisciplinarity. However, if it remains in its abstraction, it runs the risk of sterility. Afrophone 
philosophies are the intellectual discourses which are alive within their societies. Nevertheless, 
they may find it useful to broaden their horizons drawing on the general discipline (as is indeed 
many times the case). It is my belief that a dialogue between African philosophy and Afrophone 
philosophies is and will continue to be fruitful.12 
2. Philosophical influences in Kezilahabi’s late novellas 
2.1. The reflexion of philosophical influences in Kezilahabi’s late works 
There are many explicit and even more subtle and hidden references to Western as well as Afri-
can philosophical streams in the novellas13 of Euphrase Kezilahabi, Nagona (1990) and Mzingile 
(1991). In this second part, I would like to clarify some of them.  
 I will concentrate more on the discussion with Western philosophy here. In the case of foreign 
traditions, a literary reflexion is not a mere linguistic translation, but rather their creative appro-
priation within another cultural context. Kezilahabi’s way of incorporating Western philosophical 
influences in his narratives and accommodating them within the Swahili language and its con-
ceptual frame is very instructive. The two works are a critique of several concepts or even fun-
damental conceptual schemes of Western philosophy and they contain original philosophical ar-
guments.  
 In view of the emphasis laid in philosophy on the fact that thinkers be individuals and that the 
names of these individuals be rigorously cited (Oruka 1990), there could occur one problem in 
treating fiction within the discipline of philosophy, and that is the question of authorship: whose 
opinion is the opinion voiced by this or that literary character? How are we to quote that opinion, 
say, in a theoretical philosophical treatise? Although it is possible to disentangle this issue to 
some extent by going into Kezilahabi’s theoretical works, especially his doctoral dissertation, Af-
rican Philosophy and the Problem of Literary Interpretation, I would like to avoid claiming this 
and that is Kezilahabi’s opinion. That is not the point.  
 As with Plato’s dialogues, where there are various characters voicing different opinions, so are 
philosophical ideas in fictional works expressed in dialogues or in forms relativized by the 
                                                 
12 Indeed, as the terms „African philosophy“ and „Afrophone philosophies“ refer to discourses, not to persons, this 
dialogue can take place within the work of a single author, who then participates in different discourses, writes for 
different publics and effectively mediates between these discourses.  
13 Concerning the genre of the two works, see Bertoncini 2001, Gromov 1998, Khamis 1999, Khamis 2003. If I have 
opted for the term „novella“, it is not meant to contribute to this discussion.  
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author’s “poetic licence” and irony. It is perhaps more important that specific philosophical con-
cepts or conceptual contrasts get introduced into a discourse and that they become part of the in-
tellectual landscape of the participants in this discourse than that the origin and history of these 
concepts are known to them. The problem of authorship can then easily be solved by a bit more 
complicated quotation, referring to the conditions and, if necessary, the modality (the measure of 
irony) of the specific philosophical utterances. 
 Therefore, where I refer to Kezilahabi’s dissertation, it is for purposes of understanding his 
conceptualization of the problems, not to pin down his opinions in his fictional works.  
 I will discuss the following topics in my paper: the “philosophies of origin” and the issue of 
metaphysics, the criticism of Western epistemology and Freudian psychoanalysis.  
2.1.1. The philosophies of origins 
The question of “origins” is introduced in Mzingile during the astonishing encounter of the main 
character (“mimi”14) with the lizard-eating scientist. The scientist presents his ideas in a dialogue 
with the main character. It may be useful to quote this passage at length. 
[Mwanasayansi:] “Binadamu, kama angekuwa anatumia muda wake kuwaza na ku-
fanya majaribio mengi, angekuwa amekwisha kishinda kifo. Angekuwa amekwisha 
pata mbinu za kujiumba mwenyewe kwa utashi wake mwenyewe, au kuumba bin-
adamu wengine mwenye maabara. Tunashindwa nini kugundua mchanganyiko wa 
chembe hai? Wazo la kuwako kwa chanzo cha mambo limetupumbaza kwa 
muda wa karne nyingi, nalo wazo la ajali halikutusaidia kutatua kitendawili. 
Tazama kwa mfano, nani amesema kwamba mapafu kazi yake ni kuvuta hewa na ha-
yawezi kuvuta kitu kingine? Nani amesema kwamba kazi ya moyo ni kusukuma 
damu na hauwezi kusukuma kitu kingine? Tungetumia muda kujifunza jinsi mwili 
wa sisimizi unavyofanya kazi tungeweza kumpunguzia binadamu udhia mwingi na 
labda hata kumpunguzia uzito alio nao, ulazima wa kujenga maghorofa makubwa na 
kutengeneza vitanda. Ndege tunawaona lakini tunaendelea kuwabebesha wanawake 
watoto tumboni mwao kwa muda wa miezi tisa. Neno maumbile limetupumbaza.” 
[Mhusika mkuu:] “Mawazo yako mazuri, lakini kidogo nina wasiwasi na wazo la 
kuingiliana na kuvuruga mpango maalumu wa maumbile.” 
“Hiyo ndiyo maana halisi ya sayansi. Sayansi haichunguzi tu maumbile kama yalivyo 
na kuyaacha kama yalivyo. Kutokana na maumbile tuliyo nayo tunaweza kujaribisha 
maumbile mapya.” 
“Lakini maumbile yanabaki yaleyale.” 
“La! Maumbile huweza kubadilika kabisa.” Alinizungusha humo akinionyesha 
samaki wa jangwani ambao alikuwa akiwatumia kujaribishia vidonge vyake. Alini-
onyesha samaki wa jangwani ambao walikuwa hawajalazimika kula kwa muda wa 
wiki moja. 
                                                 
14 Since Gromov’s 1998 article, many critics have adopted his terminology and interpretation. The word „mimi“ is 
too suggestive of an identical, intact subject. Therefore, I will try to stick to a more neutral terminology in my pa-
per.  
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“Nimeanza kuwa na matumaini.” 
“Nimependezewa na majaribio yako. Lakini msingi wa falsafa yako unaturudisha 
nyuma tulikotoka.” 
“Kwa vipi?” 
“Kuna imani ya kuwa binadamu ndiye kitovu cha maumbile yote, na kwamba 
kila kitu ni kwa ajili ya matumizi yake. Hii ndiyo hatari ya sayansi ifuatayo 
mkondo huu. Inamwongoza binadamu katika kujiona. Chochote agunduacho sharti 
kifuatiwe na jinsi gani binadamu angeweza kukitumia kwa manufaa yake. Nina 
wasiwasi na falsafa yoyote inayojaribu kufanya sayansi na teknolojia vitawale ku-
wako kwa binadamu na mwishowe kuwa kitovu cha fikra. Sayansi na teknolojia havi-
fikiri.” 
“Binadamu anao uwezo wa kuzunguka kwenye mhimili wake mwenyewe. Asinge-
kuwa na uwezo huu angekuwa hatarini kutoweka kabisa kutoka kwenye sura ya dunia 
kama ilivyotokea kwa wanyama wengine. Juhudi zangu zaelekea katika kumhakiki-
shia binadamu kwamba atabaki milele katika sura ya dunia. Mawazo yako kidogo 
yanafanana na yangu.” (Kezilahabi 1991: 50-51, emphasis added) 
[Scientist:] “If man used his time to think and to make a lot of experiments, he would 
have already conquered death. He would have found the method of creating himself 
at his own will or of creating another human being in a laboratory. Why do we fail to 
discover the composition of the living cell? The thought of the existence of an origin 
of things has dumbfounded us for the time of many centuries and the thought of 
accident has not helped us to solve the riddle. Look, for example, who has said that 
the function of the lungs is to draw in air and that they cannot draw in something 
else? Who has said that the function of the heart is to push blood and that it cannot 
push something else? If we used the time to learn about the way the body of an ant 
functions, we could diminish many of man’s troubles and perhaps even diminish his 
weight, the necessity to build huge storey houses and to produce beds. We see the 
birds, but we go on forcing women to carry the babies in their bellies for the time of 
nine months. The word nature has dumbfounded us.” 
[Main character:] “Your thoughts are nice, but I have some doubts about that 
thought of going into and disturbing the specific ordering of nature.” 
“That is the very meaning of science. Science does not only investigate nature as it is 
and leave it as it is. In accordance with our nature we can attempt a new nature.” 
“But nature remains the same.” 
“Not at all! Nature can change completely.” He took me around there and he showed 
me desert fish that he was using to test his pills. He showed me desert fish that had 
not had to eat for a week. 
“I have begun to feel hope.” 
“I like your experiments. But the foundations of your philosophy throw us back 
where we came from.” 
“How?” 
“There is the belief that man is the centre of all nature and that everything is for 
his sake and at his disposal. That is the danger of the science that follows this ten-
dency. It leads man to pride. Whatever he discovers must go hand in hand with a way 
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how man can use it to his own benefit. I am doubtful about any philosophy that tries 
to make science and technology rule over man’s being and eventually be the centre of 
thought. Science and technology do not think.” 
“Man has the capacity to turn around his own axis. If he did not have this capacity, 
he would be in danger of disappearing completely from the face of the world, as it 
happened to other animals. My efforts aim at assuring that man remains for ever on 
the face of the world. Your thoughts are a little similar to mine.” (My translation, 
emphasis added.) 
This dialogue introduces the conceptual distinction between a thought looking for the origin of 
things and a thought investigating into their functioning. Thinking of the origins is metaphysical 
thinking: the origin determines the essence of things and the essence exercises a causal influence 
on the things. Instrumental rationality, whose prototype the scientist is, is thought free of meta-
physics. It does not investigate into the ultimate cause of things, but rather it is pragmatically ori-
ented at manipulating them.15  
 The metaphysical thought of the origin permeated Western philosophy since its beginnings in 
the natural philosophy of the Pre-Socratics until the late 19th century. In the theory of evolution, 
it experienced a slight modification in the idea of accident as the mechanism of evolution (re-
ferred to in the quote above). However, the issue of metaphysics has its repercussions until today 
and in various contexts.  
 A very troubling instance of metaphysical thought directly concerns the issue of the nature of 
present-day African philosophy. As Kezilahabi writes in the concluding part of his dissertation, 
called “Errata or a tragedy of errors”: 
Africa has been plagued with philosophies of origin. In the Western world this very 
philosophy culminated in Nazi Germany, and we know the consequences of this phi-
losophy. The oldest is not necessarily the nearest to our true Being, neither does it 
have a mandate to rule the present. It does not greatly matter whether we are the real 
true heirs to the “Stolen legacy”. What matters is what we are. A philosophy of ori-
gins is a Fascist enterprise. Philosophies of origins are another error. (Kezilahabi 
1985: 357-358) 
Here, Kezilahabi transplants the criticism of the question of the origins and of metaphysics in 
general into the historical context of the hypothesis of the origin of African civilization in Egypt. 
The “stolen legacy theory”, taking its name from a book by George G. M. James (1954), claims 
that the Egyptian civilization was Black African and that Greek philosophy was stolen from an-
cient Egypt. A version of this theory was propagated by the controversial Senegalese scholar 
                                                 
15 The title Wamitila 1991 gives to Nagona and Mzingile – „Kezilahabi’s Metaphysics“ –, applying a somewhat 
vague concept of „metaphysics“ as „something beyond the physical world, something yonder“ (Wamitila 1991: 
62), is rather unfortunate, in view of the complex meaning of „metaphysics“ in Kezilahabi (see also Kezilahabi 
1985, especially Chapter V). Wamitila holds on to this simplistic concept of the metaphysical also in his other arti-
cles on Nagona and Mzingile, where he includes a reference to „the metaphysical“ as the opposite of the physical 
(Wamitila 1998: 90) or characterizes the metaphysical as „the absurd of life“ (Wamitila 1997: 23). 
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Cheikh Anta Diop, other versions became known under the label of “Afrocentrism” (see Craw-
ford 1995). 
 In rejecting the question of the origin of African civilization, Kezilahabi rejects also the search 
for an ancient African philosophy as a viable philosophy for today’s Africa. In this, he sides with 
the Cameroonian philosopher Marcien Towa, who wrote:  
Amener au jour une authentique philosophie négro-africaine établirait à coup sûr que 
nos ancêtres ont philosophé, sans pour autant nous dispenser, nous, de philosopher à 
notre tour. Déterrer une philosophie, ce n’est pas encore philosopher. [...] La philoso-
phie ne commence qu’avec la décision de soumettre l’héritage philosophique et cul-
turel à une critique sans complaisance. (Towa 1971a: 29-30) 
To uncover an authentic Black African philosophy would establish with certainty that 
our ancestors have philosophized, without exempting us from the obligation to phi-
losophize ourselves. To exhume a philosophy is not yet to philosophize. [...] Philoso-
phy only starts with the decision to subject the philosophical and cultural heritage to 
an unmerciful critique. (My translation.) 
Towa’s solution to Africa’s philosophical dilemma resembles that of the scientist. Towa advo-
cates the “mastering of the ‘secret’ of the West” (Towa 1971a: 40), which enabled the West to 
dominate Africa in the past, and he identifies this “secret” with science and technology. Like the 
scientist, Towa wants to disclose and assimilate the knowledge of the functioning of nature.  
 But is this, the denial of metaphysics and the consequent adherence to science and technology 
really the right way? In Mzingile, after the main character and the scientist return home from the 
laboratory, there follows a passage which sheds some light on this issue: 
Baada ya hapo tulikuwa na majadiliano makali kuhusu umuhimu wa vurumai katika 
fikra, na ulazima wa kuvunja uhusiano uliopo kati ya Mtu na Kitu. (Kezilahabi 1991:  
52) 
After that we had severe discussions concerning the importance of chaos in thought 
and the need to break the relationship that there is between Man and Thing. (My 
translation.) 
The fact that the two had “severe discussions” on these issues indicates their opinions were dif-
ferent. We can conjecture at the position of the main character from his opposition to the scientist 
in the above dialogue on the origin. On the first reading, the main character seems to oppose the 
scientist from a conservative position, he seems to speak for the preservation of a respect to na-
ture, which was based on the metaphysics of origin. But what about the objection that “the foun-
dations of [the scientist’s] philosophy throw us back where we came from”? If the main charac-
ter’s position were really a conservative one, advocating a return to metaphysics, this being 
thrown back would then be a desirable state.  
 In fact, what the main character may mean is that the scientist is not radical enough in his criti-
cism of the metaphysical reference to the origin. He still dwells in the Enlightenment ideal of 
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man as the master of nature and preserves the conceptual distinction between “Mtu na Kitu”, 
which, according to the main character, must be done away with. This brings us directly to our 
next topic.  
2.1.2. The criticism of Western epistemology 
The second topic concerns both a major philosophical theme and an equally significant criticism 
of it. The main character discusses the language people will use in the “new world” (Mezger 
2002) to come after the destruction of the old world order in a dialogue with the woman with a 
shining body: 
“Sasa nafikiri yafaa tuanzishe lugha mpya,” nilitoa wazo. 
“Nami pia nimekuwa nikifikiria wazo hilo. Tutahitaji lugha ambayo haina cha Mtu na 
Kitu.” 
“Yafaa pia lugha hiyo isiwe na maneno kama ‘nyuklia’ au ‘vita’. Tutaunda lugha am-
bayo msingi wake ni kuwako.” (Kezilahabi 1991: 69) 
”Now, I think we should found a new language,” I voiced a thought. 
“Me too, I have been thinking of this. We will need a language that does not contain 
the issue of Man and Thing.” 
“This language should also not contain words like ‘nuclear’ and ‘war’. We shall cre-
ate a language whose foundation is being.” (My translation.) 
In the translation, I have rendered “Mtu” as “Man” and “Kitu” as “Thing”, as one would expect. 
However, the words in the original are written in capital letters and this indicates that they are not 
to be taken in their habitual meanings. When I read this passage, it came to my mind that Kezila-
habi might be rendering here the Western pair of concepts, “subject” and “object”, the knowing 
and the known, into Swahili. 
 Still, I was afraid to rush at this conclusion. The relationships between “Mtu” and “subject” 
and “Kitu” and “object” are a little distant, and besides, it was not clear to me what the meaning 
of “kuwako” in this passage was and what the relationship between the subject-object dichotomy, 
as I knew it, and “kuwako” could be. “Kuwako” can be translated as “existence” or “being”, and 
both of these words have a myriad of meanings in those philosophies that deal with the subject-
object problematic.  
 Fortunately, Kezilahabi’s dissertation offers clues to these questions. Kezilahabi’s project of 
“onto-criticism” seeks to “avoid the tragic epistemology of Western man” (Kezilahabi 1985: 219) 
and go beyond “the categories of Subject/Object” (Kezilahabi 1985: 215) in understanding the 
“ontological aspect of metaphor, symbol and ritual” (Kezilahabi 1985: 215). This is the task of 
onto-criticism, which Kezilahabi opposes to techno-criticism, as an external, objectifying attitude 
to literature and art.  
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 Onto-criticism then requires another kind of language. The onto-critic must “let truth be by 
privileging the silent language of Being.” (Kezilahabi 1985: 2).16 This language distinguishes 
onto-criticism from techno-criticism: “The ‘language’ of theory is grounded in techné, the lan-
guage of thinking in Being.” (Kezilahabi 1985:219)  
 The fundamental conceptual contrast is then between ontology and epistemology. Epistemol-
ogy here means the subject-object dichotomy, the splitting of reality into the knowing subject and 
the known object. This dichotomy accompanies Western philosophy since its beginnings, but a 
more influential elaboration of the problem is the result of the age of Enlightenment. It was René 
Descartes who isolated the subjective sphere. The take-off of his argument is interestingly sum-
marized in William E. Mkufya’s epic novel, Ziraili na Zirani:  
Katika karne ya kumi na sita kuelekea ya kumi na saba alitokea Mfaransa mmoja ali-
yeitwa Rene. Alikuwa mtu aliyefahamu mambo mengi. Siku moja alianzisha mfumo 
wake wa kufikiri akasema: “Kwa chochote nitakachoambiwa, nitasita kukiamini 
kwanza, kisha nitakichambua mpaka nipate uhakika. Kama nitashindwa kukihakiki-
sha basi heri nibakie kwenye shaka kuliko kukiamini.” (Mkufya 1999: 72-73) 
At the turn of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, there came a Frenchman 
called René. He was a man who knew a lot. One day he founded his thought system 
and he said: “In anything that I will be told, I will hesitate to believe it at first, then I 
will analyze it until I get certainty. If I fail to confirm it, then it is better that I remain 
in doubt rather than believe it.” (My translation.)  
The certainty that Descartes found was in the sentence: “I think.” This sentence cannot be untrue, 
because even if I am mistaken in the contents of my thought, it is still true that I think any time I 
think: “I think.” That which thinks cannot be nothing, and so Descartes concludes: “I think, there-
fore I am.” And then he goes on to equate: I am a thinking substance, a mind, a soul. But I only 
have the evidence of thinking for me, in thinking “I think”. The rest of the world, including my 
body and other people’s minds and bodies, is only given to me through representations, and the 
truthfulness of my cognitive capacities is guaranteed by the goodness of God. His existence is 
evident to me from the presence of His idea in my mind, an idea of perfection that I, as an imper-
fect being, cannot be the cause of.17 
 The problem of the subject-object dichotomy became a major issue in European philosophy 
after Descartes and it culminated in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (see especially 
Husserl 1993, Husserl 1952). Husserl also touched on topics in his works, unfortunately largely 
not published during his lifetime, which made the subject-object dichotomy problematic. These 
topics were developed by his disciples.  
                                                 
16 Note also the reference to „silence“ here. Silence is in Kezilahabi not (only) negatively connotated, but rather it „is 
the one thing that lets truth appear“ (Kezilahabi 1985: 2). This might be of relevance concerning an analysis of the 
opening passages of Nagona (cf. Khamis 1999: 13, Khamis 2003: 84f.). 
17 See Descartes 1977, Descartes 1969, Oksenberg Rorty 1982, Williams 1990. 
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 Martin Heidegger, an influential thinker of the 20th century, launched a profound analysis of 
what it actually means to be a human being in the world. The pure Cartesian subject, understood 
as a primary reality, becomes untenable (cf. Heidegger 1993: 45-46) and so does the concept of 
knowledge corresponding to the subject-object model. Knowledge is no relationship or influence 
between the subject and the object, but rather, “Erkennen ist ein im In-der-Welt-sein fundierter 
Modus des Daseins” (Heidegger 1993: 62), that is, it is a mode of being of humans which is 
based on their “being in the world”. “’Being in the world’ is a disclosing of the sphere of things 
prior to any objective knowledge and taking place in ways different from “pure knowledge”. 
Thus the human being already knows before it can aim its cognitive capacities at “objects” and 
the act of objectifying is inevitably determined by that preceding disclosure of things from the 
situation of “being in the world”.  
 The subject-object epistemological scheme was also challenged from the side of African 
philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. Perhaps the best-known is Senghor’s theory of 
“dancing the Other”. Senghor writes: 
“I think, therefore I am,” wrote Descartes, who was the European par excellence. The 
African negro could say, “I feel, I dance the Other, I am.” [...] He has no need to 
think, but to live the Other by dancing it. [...] Now to dance is to discover and to re-
create, to identify oneself with the forces of life, to lead a fuller life, and in short, to 
be. It is, at any rate, the highest form of knowledge. And thus, the knowledge of the 
African negro is, at the same time, discovery and creation – re-creation. (Senghor 
1995: 120) 
Senghor develops a theory of knowledge by emotion and of the black reason that is “intuitive by 
participation” (Senghor 1995: 120; also Senghor 1971: 289). Senghor was much criticized, often 
for reasons that are political rather than theoretical – namely for his obsequious attitude to coloni-
alism.18  
 But going back in the history of Western philosophy, there were critics who caused the grad-
ual crumbling of the Cartesian subject before Heidegger. Next to Copernicus and Darwin, who 
displaced man from the centre respectively of the cosmos and of the creation, the frontal attack at 
the free and autonomous subject was undertaken by Marx and Freud. This line of intellectual de-
velopment is sketched out in the scene of the Ngoma Kuu, the final feast, in Nagona.  
2.1.3. Freudian psychoanalysis in the history of philosophy 
During the final feast, Ngoma Kuu (“Great Dance“, or “Great Dance Performance“), there are 
four groups that were chosen to show their dances in the middle of the circle. These dances, as 
Kezilahabi writes, “[…] were dances that were famous at some time during the course of history” 
                                                 
18 The literature on Senghor is immense, but one rather representative critique is in Towa 1971b.  
AFROPHONE PHILOSOPHIES: POSSIBILITIES AND PRACTICE  
57 
(Kezilahabi 1990: 57, my translation). The titles of the songs that these groups dance to, except 
for the fourth group, are names of philosophical books or theories of major figures in the history 
of Western scholarship.  
 These thinkers are portrayed as the leaders of the groups. They are not mentioned by name in 
the text, but the first one appears to be the philosopher Aristotle, the second one the psychologist 
Freud and the third one the revolutionary Marx (or possibly another Marxist). The fourth group is 
the group of madmen, the group whose chaotic dance in the end overrides the whole feast.  
 The dancing parade is then an allegory of the history of philosophy. The first philosopher, 
Aristotle, is the founding father of Western rationalism. He gave Western philosophy its system-
atic form and he determined its conceptual frame for centuries to come.  
 The other two thinkers are two major critics of this rationalist scheme. They are the ones who 
undermined its pillar – the autonomous and free human being, having at its disposal a conscious-
ness that mirrors truly the external world –, by denuding factors that determined the human being 
to such a degree that very little remained from its autonomy and relationship to truth. A new ap-
proach to these notions became necessary. 
 These thinkers exposed two forms of determining factors that both transcend the human con-
sciousness. In Marx’ case, it was the economic and material factors: man is not free, his thought 
is only a function of his material and economic existence. And Freud prepared a frontal attack to 
human freedom and integrity by laying bare the determination of consciousness by instincts, es-
pecially the sexual drive.19  
 The fourth group points in the direction of African philosophy. This is also close to how 
Khamis (2003: 82; see also Khamis 1999: 14) understands it: 
A revolution is tacitly hinted at towards the end of the novel, where the author sym-
bolically asserts that in order to re-discover and find their ‘identity’, Africans must 
dance in their own style, however haphazard, probing and painful it may be. It is only 
through this that the world will reciprocate and recognize them favourably. 
                                                 
19 A major critic of this tendency of transcendent explanations and of the underlying reductionism was the Viennese 
psychologist Viktor E. Frankl. Transcendent explanations are such that explain away mental contents using a the-
ory that postulates a reality of some kind operating behind them and disregard the arguments propounded by these 
mental contents as mere manifestations of the reality postulated by the theory. Frankl criticized mainly psycholo-
gists, especially Freudians and Adlerians, but his reasoning is a valid criticism of all kinds of transcendent philoso-
phical arguments, such as the Marxist theory of the possibility to reduce thought to its material conditions.  
 According to Frankl, it is not incorrect to reduce a complex reality to a simpler one for purposes of study, just as 
during the projection of a three-dimensional object on a screen, we make two-dimensional representations of it, so 
a conical object appears as a triangle or as a circle. Where the reduction becomes wrong is where it turns into re-
ductionism by saying the studied object is „nothing but“ the simpler reality that we have reduced it to: „mental 
contents are nothing but the manifestation of the libido“, „mental contents are nothing but the manifestation of 
matter“ etc. To counter these reductionist trends, Frankl introduced in his „logotherapy“ such concepts as „imma-
nent criticism“ of the patient’s opinions, that is, the need to discuss the patient’s problems based on the patient’s 
own understanding of them (see Frankl 1994). 
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Chaos brings destruction to the others’ dances – a thought that reverberates in Kezilahabi’s dis-
sertation, where he emphasizes the need “to take a destructive rather than a deconstructive stand 
vis-à-vis the Western philosophy of value and representation” (Kezilahabi 1985: 4). It serves as 
liberation towards a new goal. During the chaotic dance, the main character experiences inspira-
tion and he is – symbolically – given a bow and one arrow (Kezilahabi 1990: 60). 
I will come back to the perspective that this act of liberation offers at the end of the next section. 
Here, I would like to deal with the references to Freud’s theory in more detail.  
The Freudian parade in Nagona is described in the following words: 
Kikundi cha pili kuingia kiliongozwa na mwanasaikolojia mashuhuri. Alikuwa na 
sharubu na alivaa miwani. Wafuasi wake walicheza kama watu ambao bado wamo 
ndotoni. Kikundi chake kiliimba nyimbo ziitwazo ‘Totem’, ‘Oedipus Complex’ na 
‘Neurosis’. Wakati wao wa kuonyesha malimboto20 ulipofika wagonjwa wamelazwa 
vitandani wakiota ndoto; wengine walibweka kama mbwa ndotoni. Watazamaji ha-
wakupendezewa sana na baadhi ya maneno ya kimatusitusi yaliyotumiwa katika nyi-
mbo. Watazamaji waliwatupia mawe. (Kezilahabi 1990: 58) 
The second group to enter was led by a famous psychologist. He had a moustache 
and he wore glasses. His followers danced like people who are still in dreams. His 
group sang songs that were called ‘Totem’, ‘Oedipus Complex’ and ‘Neurosis’. 
When their time to show masterpiece tricks came, the sick were placed in beds 
dreaming; others barked in dreams like dogs. The audience were not pleased much 
by some of the rude words used in the songs. The audience threw stones at them. (My 
translation.) 
The “songs” mentioned in the passage refer to Freud’s major theories, his explanation of the ta-
boos connected with totemic animals, the concept of the Oedipus complex, an incestuous longing 
of a male child for his mother and enmity against his father, and the key concept of neurosis as a 
psychological disorder caused by suppressed mental contents, usually of sexual nature. Freud saw 
dreams as a way of making manifest these unconscious contents and he developed a theory of 
dream interpretation. The access to the unconscious of man is thus indirect, through manifesta-
tions that escape conscious control, such as dreams, “slips of the tongue” and other mistakes, and 
hypnosis.  
 On the other hand, the conscious sphere is the source of mere “rationalizations” of the 
manifestations of the unconscious, that is, of false explanations that serve to obscure the real 
nature of the problems, which lies in a socially tabooed sphere: in sexuality. Freud became 
                                                 
20 „[A]maleba or amalimboto [...] are mysterious or supernatural shows of new and unfamiliar technology which 
may or may not be associated with witchcraft. Sometimes they are tricks bordering on conjuring, and sometimes 
they are daring acts which a person would not do under normal circumstances.“ (Kezilahabi 2000: 191-192). These 
„happenings“ (ibidem: 191) take place during the major climax of a dance performance in the Bakerebe society. I 
am thankful to Professor Kezilahabi for referring me to this article.  
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famous for interpreting even works of art and the greatest achievements of the intellect as “subli-
mations” of the sexual drive – as socially acceptable outlets of it.21  
 Freud’s theory thus not only sidestepped the conscious subject, but it also devalued its con-
scious contents as manifestations of another, unconscious psychical reality, which was of instinc-
tive, animal-like nature. Between the two conflicting spheres – the instinctive desires and the re-
stricting social requirements –, the human soul becomes a battlefield where these influences are 
constantly balanced out, sometimes more successfully, resulting in acknowledging the situation 
and accepting a compromise, sometimes less successfully, resulting in a neurotic adaptation that 
brings much suffering to the patient. Thus even in the sphere of action, there is no “freedom” or 
“self-determination”, there is only “health” as a balance of powers.  
 In his later works, Freud expressed these tensions of the human soul using the triad of con-
cepts, Ego, Id and Superego. 
2.1.4. Ego, Id and Superego 
The opening paragraph of Chapter IV of Nagona reads: 
Tulikuwa watatu, EGO, ID na SUPEREGO. Tulikuwa watatu katika mmoja na sauti 
yetu ilikuwa moja. (Kezilahabi 1990: 18) 
We were three, EGO, ID and SUPEREGO. We were three in one and our voice was 
one. (My translation.) 
The three terms, Ego, Id and Superego, refer to the second of Freud’s structural models of human 
psyche, which he introduced in 1923 to replace the earlier model of the conscious, the precon-
scious and the unconscious. The Ego is the rational and conscious component of the soul, it con-
trols what goes on in the consciousness and it also effectuates the suppression of not allowed 
mental contents. The Id is the source of the energy of the psyche. It is unknown and unconscious, 
it contains passions. To express the relationship between the Ego and the Id, Freud uses the 
metaphor of a rider on a horse – the rider controls and directs the energies of the horse, he de-
cides where they will go, but the force comes from the beast (Freud 1989: 109). 
 The Superego is the moral ideal of the Ego. It arises during the time when the child struggles 
with the Oedipus complex, that is, when he is forced the overcome his incestuous desire for his 
mother and his enmity against his father. The child is forced to suppress these feelings, and in-
stead, he builds up an idealized image of his father within his soul. This is then the Superego.  
 Kezilahabi breaks down the main character into these three parts and, quite consequently, he 
goes on writing in the plural when referring to the main character: 
                                                 
21 This succinct summary of Freud’s theory relies on Freud 1989, Freud 1991.  
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Kwa wakati huu serikali ilikuwa imetupa kazi ngumu ambayo tulihisi ingetufungulia 
njia mpya za kufikiri na kutatua matatizo ulimwenguni. (Kezilahabi 1990: 18) 
At this time, the government had given us a difficult task that we felt would open us 
new ways of thinking and solve the problems in the world. (My translation.) 
A few lines further, an introspection of the memory and a self-observation of the main character 
is described: 
Ni sisi hapa. 
Hakuna hata mmoja kati yetu akumbukaye jinsi tulivyofika hapa. Sote tunakumbuka 
kidogo tu kwamba serikali ilitupa ndege kwa ajili ya usafiri. Tunakumbuka jinsi 
tulivyoambiwa kujifunga mikanda kwa sababu hali ya hewa ilikuwa mbaya. Tuliweza 
bado kutambuana ingawa sura zetu zilikuwa zimebadilika kidogo. Tupo hapa. (Kezi-
lahabi 1990: 18) 
It is us here. 
There is no one among us who remembers how we got here. We all remember only a 
little that the government gave us a plane for the travel. We remember how we were 
told to fasten our belts because the weather was bad. We could still recognize one 
another, although our appearances had changed a bit. We are here. (My translation.) 
The narrative goes on in the first person plural throughout the fourth chapter. Kezilahabi con-
cludes the chapter with another self-observation of the main character: 
Tulitazamana. Kizee kilikuwa kimetufunza jambo moja – kufikiri. Tulishangaa tuli-
pojiona wazee wenye mvi. (Kezilahabi 1990: 23) 
We looked at one another. The old man had taught us one thing – to think. We were 
amazed when we saw we were grey-haired old men. (My translation.) 
What is the meaning of this breaking down of the character into three and writing about him in 
the plural? One function is certainly the destruction of the subject as a unity.22 This is in line with 
the issues dealt with so far: the overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy, the attack at the 
Cartesian subject and at the underlying metaphysics.  
 But there is another dimension – it is a call to a plurality of human beings. In that the whole 
chapter goes on in the first person plural, a sense of collective identification arises, not identifica-
tion with an individual narrator, as in most of the other chapters. (It is the opposite procedure to 
that in Chapter VIII, where a single character confesses the sins of mankind.) 
 The chapter becomes an instruction in thinking, directed towards this collective recipient and 
interlocutor. The old man (kizee) constantly puts in doubt that which to the (tripled) main 
                                                 
22 Khamis 2003 very correctly points at the „fragmented selfhood“ (Khamis 2003: 82f.) of the main character. The 
decomposition of the subject into the Freudian triad, Superego, Id and Ego, is a specific instance of this fragmen-
tation. Nevertheless, Ego should not then be identified with „mimi himself“ (Khamis 2003: 79).  
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character appears self-evident: that he is alive, that he is a human being, that he can think. The 
most striking example is when the old man comments on a dilapidated factory: 
“Ila kiwanda hiki ninakisifu kwa jambo moja tu. Ndiyo maana nimewaonyesha ki-
wanda hiki kwanza.” 
“Jambo gani?” 
“Kilikuwa kikitengeneza baiskeli ambazo hazikuwa na breki.” Tulitazamana. Kizee 
kilikuwa kimeanza tena kutoeleweka. 
“Baiskeli bila breki zawezaje kutembea?” 
“Hapa hakuna haja ya visababisho. Breki za hapa ni utashi. Ninyi mnafikiria visa-
babisho. Breki halisi ni utashi.” Tulijaribu kumwelewa, lakini mara aliendelea.  
“Mnajua! Baiskeli inasimama pale unapopataka wewe.” 
“Pamoja na huo utashi, baiskeli ambayo haina breki haitasimama pale unapopataka 
wewe.” 
“Pale itakaposimama ndipo ninapopataka.” 
“Ukigongwa na gari je! Ndipo hapo unapopataka?” 
“Hiyo ni ajali. Katika bonde hili kuna imani kuwa ajali ni mwanzo tu wa kitu au 
wazo jipya.[...]” (Kezilahabi 1990: 22-23) 
“But still, I praise this factory for just one thing. That is why I have shown this fac-
tory to you first.” 
“What thing?” 
“It produced bicycles that had no brakes.” We looked at one another. The old man 
had again begun to be incomprehensible.  
“How can bicycles without brakes ride?” 
“There is no need of causes here. The brakes of this place are will. You think of 
causes. Real brakes are will.” We tried to understand him, but he immediately con-
tinued. 
“You know! The bicycle stops where you want it.” 
“Despite that will, a bicycle that has no brakes will not stop where you want it.” 
“Where it stops, is where I want it.” 
“And if you get knocked down by a car! Is that where you want it?” 
 
“That is accident. In this valley, there is the belief that accident is only a beginning of 
a new thing or thought. [...]” (My translation.) 
In a state of decay and corruption, the old man praises the factory for what is apparently a defect 
– and what was perhaps a defect due to the negligence of the management or the workers of the 
factory. In a paradoxical turn, the old man interprets this defect as an original thought that helps 
interrogate the idea of causation.  
ALENA RETTOVÁ 
62 
 This questioning of what is apparently self-evident is precisely the meaning of thinking. The 
paradoxical reversal of the usual order of things brings new insights, often more adequate to the 
way things actually are. Thus in the myth of King Oedipus, the old man reverses cause and effect: 
“Niliwambia ueni joka kuu litameza jua! Ueni Sphinx! Mtatatua fumbo la kitendawili. 
Lakini hawakunisikiliza!” (Kezilahabi 1990: 20) 
“I told them, kill the monster, [or] it will swallow the sun! Kill the Sphinx! You will 
solve the mystery of the riddle. But they did not listen to me.” (My translation.) 
Whereas in the myth itself, the Sphinx threw herself into an abyss after Oedipus solved the riddle, 
here, the order is reversed: the solving of the riddle is a consequence of killing the Sphinx.23 So, 
could it be that perhaps there was no riddle at all, there was only the monster imposing the riddle-
solving on people willing to fight with her following her rules? 
 But there is another aspect to the Sphinx’ riddle, namely it is its answer. The riddle, mentioned 
by the 2nd century B.C. Greek historian Apollodorus in his Library, was:  
What is that which has one voice and yet becomes four-footed and two-footed and 
three-footed? (3.5.8) 
And the answer is: man.24 The answer, paradoxically, only confirms the claim that the riddle-
solving was meaningless. It advises: forget (metaphysical) monsters, concentrate on man. The 
killing of the monster is synonymous with a decided pragmatic turn in thinking. This also harmo-
nizes with Kezilahabi’s emphatic call for an African philosophy that would truly account for Af-
rica’s situation, with its political, economic and social aspects (Kezilahabi 1985: e.g. 44ff.; 
187ff.). That this turn in thinking is not the end, but rather the beginning of the task, is obvious. 
                                                 
23 The old man repeats the argument of Palaephatus, the 4th century B.C. author, who in his treatise On Unbeliev-
able Tales wrote: „Why didn’t the Thebans simply shoot the sphinx with arrows rather than stand by and see their 
fellow citizens devoured? Ridiculous!“ (quoted from the excellent essay by Andrew Wilson, from: 
http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~loxias/sphinx.htm). Indeed, early vase paintings depict Oedipus killing the 
Sphinx with a sword or a spear. The riddle appears first in connection with Oedipus and the Sphinx in Sophocles’ 
(c. 496-406 B.C.) tragedies Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus and Antigone, through which the story became 
famous. The appearance of the riddle is actually more of a riddle than the riddle itself, as the riddle itself is neither 
particularly original (see footnote 23 in this paper) nor particularly difficult. For more details, see 
http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~loxias/sphinx.htm. 
24 It is interesting to note the following: „Outside of Greece the riddle seems to be current in more or less similar 
forms among various peoples. Thus it is reported among the Mongols of the Selenga (R. G. Latham, Descriptive 
Ethnology, i.325), and in Gascony (J. F. Bladé, Contes populaires de la Gascogne, i.3-14). Further, it has been 
recently recorded, in a form precisely similar to the Greek, among the tribes of British Central Africa: the 
missionary who reports it makes no reference to the riddle of the Sphinx, of which he was apparently ignorant. See 
Donald Fraser, Winning a primitive people, London 1914, p. 171: „What is it that goes on four legs in the morning, 
on two at midday, and on three in the evening? Answer: A man, who crawls on hands and knees in childhood, 
walks erect when grown, and with the aid of a stick in his old age. „” (Quoted from Apollodorus’ Library, 
Footnote 2. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Aabo%3Atlg%2C0548%2C001&query= 
3%3A5%3A8.). I have also found a reference to the riddle in the oral art of the Oromo (a large ethnic group in 
Ethiopia, called the Galla in old sources): „Ganama luka afuriin, guyyaa luka lamaan, galgala luka sadiin deema. 
‘He goes on four legs in the morning, on two legs during the day and on three legs in the evening.’ The answer is: 
daa’ima, gayeessa, jaarsa ‘a baby, a grown up man and an old man’.“ (Griefenow-Mewis & Bitima 2004: 86).  
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2.2. A short summary 
My analysis of Nagona and Mzingile has been very fragmented, the excursions into the history of 
philosophy were short and the explanation of the philosophical context could be deeper and more 
detailed. Much has been left unsaid. Still, I believe that some of the main reference points have 
been established and that we could follow a few of the philosophical arguments presented in the 
two novellas. These arguments make up coherent philosophical positions, with many resonations 
in Western as well as in African philosophy and also with original philosophical insights and 
programmatic proposals. 
3. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to elucidate the philosophical dimension of the late works of Eu-
phrase Kezilahabi. This is done within the methodological frame of approaching literatures in 
African languages as one of the areas where philosophical reflexion takes place in present-day 
African societies. I have coined the term of “Afrophone philosophies” to refer to all of these dis-
courses, including oral literatures, modern and classic written literatures, and other forms of in-
tellectual discourse. They are categorized as belonging here according to the criterion of language 
and the criterion of the function of exercising the philosophical reflexion in the given African so-
ciety, reflecting various influences affecting it. The influences of Western philosophy affect the 
Swahili-speaking societies without any doubt and Kezilahabi’s novellas are a critical way of 
dealing with them. In them, he introduces, among others, Western philosophical issues into the 
specific cultural context of these societies by conceptualizing them in the Swahili language. He 
critically reflects them and proposes original solutions. 
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